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must be right for visual art, and mutatis mutandis for music, though more does need to
be said about aesthetic ideas and about what being ‘interesting’ amounts to. On
these matters both Kant and Crowther must be on the right track. But an adequate
account would exclude the possibility of an alternative ‘critical horizon’ which
assigned aesthetic value to what is merely amusing or pretentious.
University of Oxford R C.S. W
Hegel and the Analytic Tradition. E  A N. (London: Continuum,
. Pp. vii + . Price £..)
Talk of a ‘Hegel Renaissance’ within the analytic tradition has become almost
commonplace. However, a closer look reveals that various Renaissances, in part
incompatible, are in progress now (some of them are distinguished along rough
geographical criteria: there is talk of Chicago Hegelians, Pittsburgh Hegelians,
Münster Hegelians, etc.). Among the proponents of these various Renaissance
movements there are very diﬀerent views as to what it is about Hegel’s philosophy
that deserves to be revived in the current philosophical climate. In addition, the
Hegel Renaissances tend to go along with a critical re-reading of the history of
analytic philosophy itself: for instance, was the crucial break with Hegelianism at the
dawn of the movement based on a simple misunderstanding on Moore’s and Russell’s
part? Did they fail to distinguish Hegel’s philosophy from the varieties of Hegel-
ianism now grouped together under the heading of ‘British idealism’? In all these
respects the present volume promises some clarification. The editor’s introduction
says (p. ) that it aims to be useful both ‘with regard to the renewal of Hegel scholar-
ship and with regard to the advancement of the current philosophical agenda’.
It comes as little surprise that the contributors to the volume agree that Hegel’s
philosophy deserves a renaissance. But what is this philosophy all about in the first
place? In textbooks Hegel is usually classified as a proponent of ‘absolute idealism’,
as opposed to Kant’s ‘subjective idealism’ and Schelling’s ‘objective idealism’. Inter-
estingly, the volume reflects a growing consensus that Hegel is not an idealist at all:
according to Franca D’Agostini, Hegel is an idealist only in the almost truistic sense
of a strictly philosophical idealism. This involves nothing more than ‘the awareness
that speaking philosophically of this or that particular thing is speaking of the ideal-
ized version of those things’ (p. ), and it is quite compatible with acknowledging a
mind-independent world that provides the subject-matter for the sciences. The
results of the sciences are then given the form of a system by philosophical thinking
(cf. pp. –).
Joseph Margolis, in ‘The Point of Hegel’s Dissatisfaction with Kant’, diagnoses a
‘recovery of realism’ (p. ) in Hegel as against Kant’s transcendental project. How-
ever, it is a recovery that undergoes a ‘pragmatist fragmentation’ (ibid.): both reality
itself and the a priori/a posteriori distinction in epistemology are thoroughly histor-
icized as reflections of open-ended, non-teleological processes. In contrast, Tom
Rockmore seems to disagree fundamentally with the realist consensus: according to
him, the analytical renaissance of Hegel in its entirety goes wrong in interpreting
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‘Hegel without idealism’ (p. ). By discussing philosophers as diverse as Beiser,
Brandom and Westphal, Rockmore tries to prove that the analytic Hegel inevitably
turns out to be a metaphysical realist (understood as someone who tries to defend
realistic common sense intuitions). Rather confusingly, however, Rockmore’s own
reading of Hegel as an idealist construes him as an empirical realist (sic – cf.
pp. –). Empirical realism, as defined by Rockmore, in turn implies scepticism
concerning knowledge of the external world; all knowledge has to be constructed on
the basis of what is given in experience. Finally, Terry Pinkard identifies it as one of
Hegel’s most important achievements that he lays to rest the realism/idealism
dichotomy itself. This dichotomy is said to presuppose a scheme/content divide
which Pinkard’s Hegel has once and for all overcome by relying on a deflationary,
Wittgensteinian conception of historically evolving forms of life. Independently of
the function they serve within such ongoing practices, philosophical terms of art
simply make no sense, according to Pinkard’s Hegel.
It would take at least another Phenomenology just to sort out the various interpreta-
tions of the realism/idealism distinction at work in the volume. To make matters
worse, most of these interpretations are mutually incompatible and highly idiosyn-
cratic with regard to the usage familiar from contemporary analytic philosophy.
At this point, confused readers might look for some relief. They may find it, for
instance, in David Kolb’s stimulating critique of the idea that Hegel’s Logic tries to
establish a unique self-determining and final sequence of categories. Against this idea,
Kolb points out that even crucial categories like ‘Form/Matter’ or ‘Form/Content’
are located at quite diﬀerent places in the various versions of the Logic – which seems
hard to reconcile with the idea that there is one unique place for them and that their
location in the sequence is responsible for their very content. In the end Kolb opts
for considering the Logic as ‘an assemblage of reusable chunks of insights’ (p. ),
which can and should be appropriated where it seems fit from the point of view of
our own problems. This is a possible alternative to the rather pointless exchange
of abstract labels which are meant to characterize Hegel’s project as a whole. In a
similar vein, Katharina Dulckeit’s contribution compares Hegel’s and Putnam’s
respective attempts at providing a theory of natural-kind terms. She not only un-
covers crucial similarities in Putnam’s and Hegel’s approaches to the problem, but
even reaches the conclusion that Hegel wins the day by delivering ‘where Putnam
merely assumes’ (p. ), i.e., by explaining how ostensive definition is possible.
Historical questions which deal with the break with Hegelianism as one of the
crucial impulses of early analytic philosophy get very little attention in the volume.
(But see Westphal’s contribution, which turns the tables on Russell and criticizes
from a Hegelian perspective his theory of knowledge by acquaintance.) However,
the volume stands out among similar publications by the attention almost all
contributors pay to Hegel’s Logic. The Logic is the crucial work for an evaluation of
Hegel’s system; but as is justly emphasized by the editor (cf. p. ), it has received
almost no attention from authors working in the analytical tradition, who still favour
the Phenomenology. None the less the overall impression the reader gets from the
volume is a rather sobering one: the dialogue between Hegel scholarship on the one
hand and analytic philosophy still hovers uncomfortably between two extremes. On
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the one hand, there are mere abstract assertions (and their denial) of the general
superiority of the Hegelian project (without any consensus on the defining features
of that project). On the other hand, there are piecemeal appropriations of isolated
Hegelian arguments which hardly do justice to Hegel’s repeated insistence on the
holistic and organic nature of his philosophical system.
University of Giessen C H
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